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Stromberg v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1 (Jan. 29, 2009)1
CRIMINAL LAW – DUI
Summary
Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s decision to deny
petitioner’s request to apply for treatment.
Disposition/Outcome
Petition granted.  NRS 484.37941 allows third-time DUI offenders who enter a plea of
guilty on or after July 1, 2007 to apply for treatment pursuant to the statute.  Further, NRS
484.37941 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.  The clerk of the court is to issue a
writ of mandamus instructing the district court to consider Stromberg’s request to plead guilty
and apply for treatment.
Factual and Procedural History
On May 29, 2007, Stromberg was charged with his third count of driving under the
influence (“DUI”) within a seven year period, a class B felony.  On June 8, 2007, Stromberg
entered a plea of not guilty in the district court and told the court that it was his intention to
change his plea to guilty after July 1, 2007, so he would be eligible to participate in a three-year
treatment program that would become effective on July 1 , 2007.2
Stromberg returned to court on July 7, 2007 and changed his plea to guilty and applied
for the treatment program.  The State, however, opposed the plea change and argued that the
statute did not apply retroactively to offenses that occurred before July 1, 2007.  Stromberg
argued the plain language of the statute applied retroactively to offenses committed before the
statute went into effect.  The district court ordered a briefing regarding NRS 484.37941.
The district court held a hearing on August 7, 2007, regarding Stromberg’s application for
treatment.  The district court determined that the statute’s language did not indicate clear
legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively and denied Stromberg’s request.  The district
court granted a stay pending review of the Nevada Supreme Court’s review.
Discussion
Retroactivity and NRS 484.37941
Stromberg argued that the statute’s plain language applies to guilty pleas entered before
or after July 1, 2007.  The State argued that Stromberg is not entitled to treatment because the
offense occurred before the effective date of the statute and in order for an offender to be eligible
for treatment, the offense had to have occurred after the statute’s effective date.  
The Court held in a previous case that the plain language of NRS 484.37941 indicates the
Legislature’s intent to apply the statute to all offenders pleading guilty on or after July 1, 2007.3
1 By Brandon Johansson.
2 See 2007 NEV. STAT., CH. 288 § 6, at 1064; NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.37941 (2007).
3 Picetti v. State, 124 Nev. ___, 192 P.3d 704, 711 (2008).
The Court specifically stated in Picetti that, “anyone entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
after the statute’s effective date is eligible to apply for treatment.”4  Based on the Court’s
affirmation of the Picetti decision, the Court determined that the district court abused its
discretion when it refused to allow Stromberg to apply for treatment. 
NRS 484.37941 and the Separation-of-Powers Doctrine
The State argued that NRS 484.37941 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because
it gives the district court the power to determine how to charge a DUI offender when that is a
power of the executive branch of government through the prosecutor.  The Court found that NRS
484.3791 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.  The Court used two California
Supreme Court cases where the state made similar arguments as in the present case to illustrate
the line between the prosecutor’s decision in how to charge and prosecute and the court’s
authority to dispose of a case once a case is its jurisdiction.5  
The Court found the California cases’ reasoning persuasive for two reasons.  First, the
district court’s decision to grant or deny an offender’s application for treatment under NRS
484.37941 follows the prosecutor’s decision to charge an offender for a third DUI offense.  After
the charging decision has been made, the only exercise of discretion allowed is between the
legislative prescribed penalties.  The Court concluded that a district court’s decision to allow an
offender to enter a treatment program is analogous to sentencing an offender to probation;
therefore, the decision would fit under the purview of the district court.6
Second, the Court found that NRS 484.37941 does not limit the prosecutor’s discretion to
determine whether to charge a third-time DUI offender with a lessor offense.  This is important
because a second-time DUI offender who completes the treatment program can nevertheless be
treated as a third-time DUI offender for the purpose of enhancement if the offender is convicted
of another DUI.7
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of NRS 484.37941 allows
third-time DUI offenders who entered guilty pleas on or after July 1, 2007 to apply for treatment.
The Court also concluded that NRS 484.3791 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The Court granted the petition and ordered the clerk of the court to issue a writ of mandamus
instructing the district court to consider Stromberg’s plea of guilty and application to apply for
treatment pursuant to NRS 484.3791.
4 Id. at 712.
5 See Esteybar v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial Dist., 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1971); People v. Superior
Court of San Mateo County, 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974).
6 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.100 (2007).
7 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.3792(2) (2007).
